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plaintiff had been forged. These stocks \\'PrP:
Knickerbocker Fund, Mountain Fuel Supply Co., and
Commercial Credit Co.
The signature of the plaintiff on the earlier stock
certificates had also been forged with the exception
of the signature on one stock certificate. All of thr
transactions concerning the loans and pledge of stock
occurred between the bank and Francis B. Goeltz
without any knowledge upon the part of the plaintiff,
and the money realized from the loans was credited
to the account of Francis B. Goeltz at said bank. These
stocks had been wrongfully removed from Ure, Pett
& Morris by Francis B. Goeltz, where they had been
deposited by the plaintiff to her own account.
Plaintiff discovered the facts surrounding the
loans and pledge of stock much later, (R. 52,-53) and
immediately upon discovery, went to the Bank and
demanded her stock and indicated to the Bank that
the pledge was entirely wrongful, (R. 53,-58) and
that the signatures on the notes purporting to be hers,
were in fact forgeries. ( R. 53-58)
The bank refused to return the stock to her on
demand. The plaintiff had in the interim sold the
stock before she knew of its pledge to the bank, and
b.ecause of the economic compulsion involved and
the advice received from her economic adviser which
had led to the sale, found herself in a position where
2
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she could not otherwise meet her contractual obligation than by consenting to substitute other stock for
the pledged stock which the bank required of her. She
consented only under the pressure of the situation and
because of the economic compulsion involved, and
protested that the bank had no right to make such
demand, and only upon the understanding with the
bank that she reserved all rights in the stock and was
allowing the bank to hold the stock only under protest. This was fully understood by the bank . (R.5158) These stocks were Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
and Douglas Aircraft Co. stock.
Thereafter the bank refused to retum the stock
to the plaintiff, and indicated to her that they would
sell the same to realize on the pledge to reimburse
for the loans which had not been repaid. (R. 59)
At the time a deposition was taken the plaintiff
\Vas unable to locate her records of the deposit of the
original stocks with Ure, Pett & Morris and refresh
her memory concerning their deposit several years
earlier with that brokerage, but indicated that she
thought the stocks had been endorsed by her prior to
being placed with Ure, Pett & Morris, although she
expressed doubt that she had signed them all.
Subsequently she located some old stock records and
became convinced that she had not endorsed at least
one of the certificates since it had been acquired
3
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subsequent to the original deposit. She made a full
and complete explanation of these circumstances to
the court, and indicated that her best recollection
therefore was that if her signature was on that
particular stock certificate, that it had been placed
there by someone else, and without her authorization.
CR. 50) Subsequently the stock certificates involved,
or photostatic copies thereof, where introduced, and
two of the three bore signatures that in no way corresponded with the signature of the plaintiff, and
· were, in fact, obvious forgeries, apparent to anyone.
CR. 137, 138) One signature in all the documents
involved was a bona fide signature of the plaintiff,
· and was so patently different from the others as to
leave no doubt as to the fact that they were not signed
by the same person. Ex. 1, 2, 14, 15, 16.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

The statute of Hmitations has no application to this case.

11..

There was no error on the part of the Court in refusing to
allow Defendant bank to amend its answer to plead the
statute of limitations.

Ill.

Plaintiff was in no way estopped to deny the validity of the
pledge of the Knickerbocker Fund stock.
(A) The forgery on the other stock certificates
pledged simultane·ously and the forgeries on the promissory
notes were patent.
(B) The trial court found against the defendant
factually on the issue of notice as to defects in the trans-

4
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action, and that finding is not reviewable on this appeal
as to sufficiency of evidence or facts upon which based.
(C) The defendant bank was not an innocent party
in this transaction entitled to rely upon the doctrine of a
claimed estoppel.
( D} The defendant failed to establish that it was
a holder for value without notice of the Knickerbocker Fund
certificate.
(E) The Knickerbocker Fund certificate is not one of
those in the possession of the defendant which plaintiff sued
to recover.
IV.

There is no mer;t to appellant's contention that it had no
notice of infirmity in the Knickerbocker Fund Certificate, nor in
the assertion of this point on appeal.

Point I.
The statute of limitations has no application to this
case.

Plaintiff's complaint sets forth the fact that the
stocks wrongfully retained by the defendant were
the stocks which had been substituted, under protest,
for the earlier and illegally pledged stocks. The
complaint alleges that the demand by the defendant
that such stocks be substituted was wrongful that the
assertion by the bank that they would retain those
stocks and not return them to the plaintiff was wrongful, and that its refusal to return them to the plaintiff
\vas wrongful, as were the threats to dispose of the
stock to realize upon them as security. (R. 1-3)

5
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The suit was for the specific purpose of recovering from the defendant tl1e stocks which it held, that
is, 6 shares of Douglas Aircraft Company Stock and
25 shares of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
stock.
The only way in which the stock formerly
pledged wrongfully by Francis B. Goeltz appears in
the _picture is by reason of the fact that a review of
the circumstances surrounding the pledge of that
stock was necessary in order to determine whether
the defendant had a right to hold the substituted stock
based upon its claim that the earlier stock had been
rightfully pledged. The court found that the bank
had no right to the original stock, hence it had no
right to claim the subsequently acquired stock.
The time element which is involved can only
be measured from the date of the subsequent acquisition of stock, that is, the Douglas Aircraft and the
Goodyear stock. Since that acquisition and detention was without right, based as it was upon the
wrongful possession of the original stock, the subsequently acquired stock was also wrongfully acquired
and wrongfully held, and the demand by the bank
that the stock be pledged in exchange for the prior
stock was wrongful, as was its subsequent retention
by the bank and the refusal to return it.
Thus, this was not a suit to recover stock in the
6
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possession of a converter for a period in excess of the
Statute of Limitations, but one for the return of
stock wrongfully held for a briefer period, and based
upon their wrongful act in requiring the deposit of
the stock and their wrongful detention of it thereafter. No claim is made by the defendant that the
Douglas and Goodyear stock had been held for a
period in excess of the limitations period, nor is such
the case. It is the subsequent wrongful dete11tion of
that stock which is the issue of this case.
In fact, the action could not be one for the return of the stock first wrongfully held by the bank,
that is, the stock wrongfully pledged by Francis B.
Goeltz, since that stock was returned to plaintiff
under circumstances heretofore indicated.
Defendant in its argument loses sight of the
wrongful acts complained of in its argument seeking
to date the period of limitations from an earlier
wrongful act of detention of other stock.
The defendant had no right to the original stock
because of the fact of its wrongful pledge as found by
the court, and since defendant had no right in the
original stock, it had no right to demand of plaintiff
that she substitute other stock, and no right to retain
such other stock. The detention of the subsequent
stock was a separate and distinct wrongful act, and
one which plaintiff sued to establish and recover for.
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The basis for examination into the original pledge
was for the purpose of determining whether defendant could rightfully insist upon the substitution of
other stock and the retention of that stock. It has no
basis whatsoever in the determination of the period of
limitations. The true issue involved, that is, that
defendant had no right to retain the subsequent stock
was found factually in favor of the plaintiff. It was
determined by the court that possession by the bank
of the original stock was wrongful and that they were
charged with notice of the defect in their holding,
hence they· had no right to hold the stock later acquired.
Point II.
There was no error on the part of the Court in refusing to allow Defendant bank to amend its answer to
plead the statute of limitations.

Defendant makes much of the fact that there
was a change in testimony of the plaintiff between
the time of the taking of her deposition in this matter,
and the time of trial. It is true, that at the deposition
Mrs. Goeltz testified that she had signed all three
-~ certificates, she thought. She did express doubt that
she had signed some stocks CDep. 22). She indicated
.also, that it was only the stock in her original folio
which she had received from an inheritan_ce which
she had signed (Dep. 4, 5, 22). At that time she had
not had the opportunity to review the old files and
<i.
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records concerning the original deposit with Ure,
Pett & Morris, to determine which stocks had been
in the original folio. At the trial she made it entirely
clear that an examination and search of her records
on the subject revealed that at least one of the three
stocks had not been in the original investment folio
and hence had not been signed by her. (R. 50) She
had no other source of reference at that time, and her
testimony on this score was entirely substantiated by
the stock c:~ertificates when they were produced. (R.
134-138 Ex. 14, 15, 16) Two of the certificates were
not signed by her, and had been no part of the
original folio.
The bank had full knowledge of the time at
which Francis B. Goeltz had pledged the original
stocks in security of a loan from that bank, hence the
information was entirely available to the bank at all
times from which it could and should have asserted
its claimed defense of statute of limitations. Nothing
about the testimony of the plaintiff at the time of the
deposition lulled the defendant into failing to assert
this defense. The plaintiff had no accurate information as to exactly when Francis B. Goeltz pledged the
stocks, even at the time of the filing of her complaint.
This was information solely within the possession of
the defendant bank so far as plaintiff was concerned.
The statute of limita-tions as a defense was available to the defendant to plead as a bar, if it deemed
9
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it applicable, at the time it filed its answer. Nothing
about the testimony of plaintiff at the deposition
changed that picture. The fact that plaintiff did
or did not sign the stock certificates did not affect
the defense of limitations which could ha~e been
asserted by the defendant at the time of filing its
answer. In fact, defendant raised the defense of
laches and certainly had in mind this general problem at the time of filing its answer.
There is absolutely nothing about the facts of
this case which would in any was justify the inclusion
of the defense of limitations after the trial of the case.
The issue could and should have been raised in defendant's pleadings well in advance of the trial in
order the plaintiff have the opportunity of meeting
the issue. Instead, the issue is sought belatedly to
be raised after all of the evidence was in.
Plaintiff feels that this issue of amendment to
plead the Statute of Limitations is fairly represented
by the following quotations from 34 Am. Jur. 351,
Sec. 447:
" ... where the defendant does not plead
the statute of limitations, an order _made after
the trial granting the parties the privilege
of amending their pleadings to conform to the
facts proved does not entitle the defendant t.o
file an answer pleading the statute, and 1f
filed, the court may strike such answer plead10
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ing the statute, it appearing that the original
did not amount to a pleading of the statute
and was insufficient to furnish the basis for
such an amendment."
and at Section 448:
'"In general, the refusal of permission to
plead the bar of the statute of limitations by
way of amendment to an answer already filed
will not be regarded as an abuse of discretion,
unless it is made to appear that the amendment
will be in furtherance of justice. Because of
the strict nature of this defense, it should be
pleaded in the first instance, and allowed no
grace of right thereafter, where it is claimed
solely as a legal advantage; and hence, the
refusal to allow an amendment pleading the
statute of limitations is within the discretion
of the court and will not ordinarily be
disturbed."
To like effect see City of St. Paul v. Bielenberg 164
Minn. 72, 204 N.W. 544; Steiner v. Amsel, 18 Cal.
2d 48, 112 P. 2d. 635.
\

Certainly the furtherance of justice would not
h~ve been served by allowing the defendant in the
present instance to plead and rely upon the statute of
limitations in the face of the fact that a patent
forgery existed of which the defendant was charged
with notice.
The evidence of the forgery as characterized by
11
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the authority on the subject, Mr. Goddard, was such
that anyone should have known of its being a forgery,
without special training. Council for Defendant
stipulated that Mr. Goddard would testify "anyone
can see it." (R. 138) The defendant has failed
completely and utterly to indicate in any way whatsoever how the interests of justice will be advanced
and aided by his being allowed to belatedly impose
this asserted defense.
Practically, the belated effort to insert the statute
of limitations as a defense after all evidence on both
sides had been introduced stemmed from the fact
that defendant after hearing the evidence and
observing the exhibits realized the futility of its position relative to any substantive defenses in the case,
and seized upon the statute of limitations as a last
straw, belated defense to the inevitable.
Certainly the factual picture here involved, that
is, an innocent plaintiff and a defendant charged
with knowledge, as found by the court, does not
justify the reversal of the trier of facts on the basis
of an abuse of discretion, which is necessarily the test
required to be met.
It is respectfully submitted, that the defendant
showed no ground for the amendment of his answer
to justify the same in the furtherance of justice; that
in fact no such justification exists; that plaintiff
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

established on the contrary an obvious and patent
forgery observable to the untrained as well as the
trained person; that rlefendant was chargefl with
knowledge of the forgery, and could not blind itself
to that forgery; that defendant was bound thereby
and wrongfully demanded a substitution of stocks
and a wrongful detention of the same, and that
plaintiff is entitled to the return of the same. That
the defendant has a judgment against the true wrongdoer-Francis B. Goeltz, and should be required to
pursue that debtor.
Point III
Plaintiff was in no way estopped to deny the
validity of the pledge of the Knickerbocke·r Fund stock.

There are several reasons why the argument
of the defendant at point three of its brief is without
merit, which reasons are hereinafter treated as subdivisions hereof.
(A). The forgery on the other stock certificates pledged
simultaneously and the forgeries on the promissory notes
were patent.

One basis upon which the defendant in this case
is stripped of any right or ability to claim the benefit
of the Knickerbocker Fund stock certificate which
bore the signature of Marian Story Goeltz, is the manner in which the possession of that certificate was
obtained.
13
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This is well illustra_ted by the colloquy between
court and counsel CR. 123), wherein the court said:
Court: ". . . But if he brings in three
of them and one we say is a forgery, does that
one apple spoil the whole basket?"

Mr. Billings: "I would say it did, if the
forgery was so apparent as to put us on notice
on those two."
Actually, the factual picture is much more favorable to the plaintiff than even this statement, since
the signature on the notes were patent forgeriescharacterized as very crude by Mr. Goddard (R. 86)
and "obvious" CR. 88), and the testimony of Mr.
Goddard as stipulated by counsel (R. 138) with
reference to the forged signatures on the stock certificates "that anyone can see it," and the l(nickerbocker
signature was/ genuine signature.
In view of this testimony and stipulation, it is
difficult to see how the defendant can now claim the
benefit of that pledge, obtained as it was in conjunction with obvious·forgeries.
(B) The trial court found against the defendant factually on the issue of notice as to defects in the transaction,
and that finding is not re·viewable on this appeal as to
sufficiency of evidence or facts upon which based.

The trial court found that the defendant was
charged with notice of the forgery of plaintiff's name
14
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on the other stock certificates and promissory notes.
The defendant made no objection to the findings as
entered by the trial court below, at which time he
could have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence,
the form of the finding, or the legal propriety thereof.
He did none of these things. Nor did the defendant
see fit to set out in his statement of points in this case
any point challenging this or other findings so that
a review thereof might be had. This it was obliged
to do under Rule 75 (d), since there was not a designation for inclusion of the complete record and all proceedings. Nor did the defendant see fit to raise the
issue of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
findings by any designation of such an issue in its
brief.
Respondent therefore takes the position that the
bank has no issue before the court under this statement of point relied upon which is reviewable in any
way in which the bank could be gran~ed any relief.
(C) The defendant bank was not an innocent part in
this transaction en_titled to rely upon the doctrine of a
claimed estoppel.

The defendant was not an innocent party in the
present case. The court made an express finding
that the defendant was charged with notice, as indicated above. The fact that the bank was not an innocent party has been established, and that issue is

15
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at rest for the reasons heretofore indicated under
abpve.

(B)

The very case relied upon by the defendant and
quoted at length in its brief at page 21, Adams v.
Silver Shield Min. & Co., 82 Ut. 586, 21 P. 2d 886,
which incidentally held against the claimed holder
for value, and hence against the position of the defendant in the present case, indicates in the quotation
used by the defend.ant in its brief, the basis for estoppel in a proper case, that is: "Where one of two innocent people must suffer, the true owner, by delivering
the certificate indorsed in blank has enabled the third
party to perpetrate the wrong and therefore should
be estopped from asserting his ownership."
Since the bank was not an innocent party to the
transaction by which it came into the possession of
the Knickerbocker certificate, it is not entitled to the
benefit of any estoppel as against the true innocent
party in the proceedings, that is, the plaintiff.
In the case of Malia v. Giles, (Utah), 114 P. 2d
208, a case wherein the husband had pledged stocks
belonging to his wife in security of his obligation and
had forged her signature thereon, the court held
that the pledgee could not rely upon such a- pledge
since husband could acquire no authority· to forge
his wife's name. Likewise here, the bank cannot rely
upon forged signatures, arid with notice of the forged

.16
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signatures rely upon a single valid signature in a
tainted transaction.
(D)
The defendant failed to establish that it was a
holder for value without notice of the Knickerbocker
Fund certificate.

Before the defendant could prevail in any event
on a theory of estoppel, it would be incumbent upon
defendant to establish affirmatively that it was a
bona fide holder for value without notice. of defects.
This is an affirmative burden which the defendant
was bound to sustain. West Coalinga Oil Field Corp.
v. Robinson, (Cal.), 194 P. 2d 554; Thomas v. Atkins,
52 F. Supp. 405; Bank of U. S. v. Cooper Business
Corp., 261 N.Y. S. 687; First National Bank v. Van
Horn, 2 S. W. 2d 333.
Defendant not only failed to sustain such a
burden, but to the contrary, the findings of the court
were against the defendant on this issue.
(E)
The Knickerbocker Fund certificate is not one of
those in the possession of the defendant which plaintiff
sued to recover.

Much of what has been said under Point I, is
applicable to the argument which respondent makes
at this point. That is, the bank does not have possession of the Knickerbocker stock, the suit was for the
recovery of the Goodyear and Douglas Aircraft stocks,
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the assertion of this claim by the defendant at
this point loses sight of the true nature of the suit.
IV.

There is no .merit to appellant's contention that
it had no notice of infirmity in the Knickerbocker Fund
certificate, nor in the assertion of this point on appeal.

. What has .been said with reference to point III
heretofore provides a complete answer to Point IV
. of appellant's brief, and reference thereto is made,
. particularly in answer to the argument as to whether
there is a dissimilarity in the signatures sufficient to
. put a person of affairs on notice. Point III (A). The
testimony there set out and the balance of the testimony :givel} by Mr. Goddard certainly removes any
, doubt in :this _respect, as does even a casual examination of the questioned documents.
What has been said at point III (B) and CC)
of respondent's brief with respect to the fact that the
findings in this matter are at rest, is also applicable
to point IV sought to be raised by the appellant, and
is also conclusive of this issue, and provides a full and
complete answer to it.
As an answer to the assertions of counsel that
there is no evidence but that defendant treated the
pledged stock as that of plaintiff's husband, it does
not appear that this is a matter which could or should
be determinative of the case. However, far from
indicating t.hat the defendant treated the pledged
18
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stock as that of the husband, the affidavit of the VicePresident of the bank in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case certainly indicates to the
contrary, as do par. 1 of Defendant's first Counterclaim, par. 1 of its Second Counterclaim and par. 1 of
its Third Counterclaim, and the prayer for relief
against the plaintiff. (R. 6, 7, 8.)
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
after having carefully followed the evidence in this
case and the exhibits thereof, made its findings and
decision based upon a fully sustainable view of the
case, and a correct view of the case. That none of
the points raised by the appellant on this appeal have
merit. That the case does complete and substantial
justice to all parties, as decided by the trial court, and
places the burden upon the bank to proceed against
the proper culprit for the collection of the money
he owes the bank, and it relieves a totally innocent
party and protects her rights. The appellant has
failed to attack the findings of the court on any of
the issues that are involved, that those findings thus
are the law of the case, and the defendant is bound
by them, and that the judgment should be affirmed
by this court.
Respectfully submitted
OWEN, WARD, SHEFFIELD
and GREENWOOD

Attorneys for Respondent
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